Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1956

Frank E. Douglas and Drue E. Douglas v. R. C.
Duvall : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinne
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Douglas v. Duvall, No. 8484 (Utah Supreme Court, 1956).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2552

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

CASE NO. 8484

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

FRANK E. DOUGLAS, and
DRUE E. DOUGLAS,

P..laintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
R. C. DUVALL,

Defendant a_nd Respondent

Respondents Brief

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Statement of Facts ···········--------------------·········-··----------------- 1
Statement of Points ·········-···········································--- 13
Argument
I.

The court did not err in submitting
the matt'er to the jury upon special
interrogatories _____ .______ ..... ________________________ ----------- 13

II.

The court did not err in its instructions to the jury -------------------------------------------------III. The court did not err in any comments by it upon the evidence during
the course of its instructions ---------------------------IV. The Court did not err in refusing to
allo'v counsel to read excerpts from
a transcript of defendant's testiinony
during final argument -------------------------------------V. The court did not err in refusing to
direct a verdict in favor of plaintiffs
on the transaction of December 4,
1950. --------------------.------------------------------------------------Conclusion ____________________ .__ .___ .____________ ------------------------------------

24

23

24

29
39

AUTHORITIE,S
Ackerman v. Bramwell Investment Company,
80 U. 2, 12 P. 2nd 623 ---------------------------------------------- 30, 31
Aas'en v. Aasen, 228 Minn. 1, 36 N.W. 2d 27 ------------------ 28
Barnes v. Eastern and Western Lumber Co.,
(Ore.) 287 P. 2d 939 ------------------------------------------------------ 23
Bonderson v. Hovde, 150 Minn. 175, 184 N.W.
853 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 28
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Campbell v. Zions Co-op Hon1e Building &
Real Estate Co. 46 U. 1, 148 P. 401 ------------------------------ 32
Chicago I. and L. Ry. Co. v. Gorman, 106 N.E.
897 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26
Gephart v. Stout, 118 P. 2d 801 ---------------------------------------- 28
Hecht v. Metzler, 14 U t. 408, 48 P. 37 ---------------------------- 36
Howard v. Swagart et al, 161 F. 2d 651 ________________________ 4
Hull v. Flinders, 83 U. 158, 27 P. 2d 56 ------------------------ 31
Johnson v. Baltimore and 0. Ry. Co., 208 F.
2d 633 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
Kinnear v. Prows, 81 U. 135, 16 P. 2d 1094 ____ 31, 34, 35, 36
McConkie v. Babcock, 70 N.W. 103 -------------------------------- 27
Menefee v. Blitz, 179 P. 2d 550 ---------------------------------------- 37
Pace v. Parrish, ______ Utah ______ , 247 P. 2d 273 ____ 2, 3, 15, 35
Reynolds v. Clyde ______ Utah ______ , 298 P. ( 2,) 530 ______________ 1
Smith v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 140 P. 685 ____________ 28, 29
State v. Seymour, 49 lT. 285~ 163 P. 789 ------------------------ 39
Taylor v. ~foore, 87 U. 493, 51 P. 2d 222 ------------------------ 21
Wells Fargo & Co. Express v. \-V. B. Baker
Lumber Co., 171 S. \-V. 132 -------------------------------------------- 2i
Westling v. Hohu, 58 N.\Y-. 2nd 252 ------------------------------ 28
TEXTS
Ameriean J urisprudenee, \'ol.

33~

Page 638 ________________ 19

Corpus Juris Secundu1n, \ 1 ol. 88, Page 347 ---------------- 26
Corpus Juris Secundu1n, \T ol. 88, Page 952 ________________ 19
Moore's Federal Praetiel\ , . . ol. 5~ Page 2207 ________________ 18
STATUTES
43 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ---------------------------- 3
49, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure -------------------------- 14, 18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

FRANK E. DOUGLAS, and

DRUE E. DOUGLAS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
R. C. DUVALL,

Defendant and Respondent

STATEJ\IENT OF FACTS
In view of the points raised by Appellants in this
appeal, a somewhat co1nprehensive statement of facts
is necessary. As this is a law case, and the jury found
the facts in favor of Respondent, the facts are to be
viewed in a light favorable to Respondent, and the
lower court will be affirmed if there is evidence to supUtah, -,
port the verdict. (Reynolds 'V. Clyde, 298 P. (2) 530.).
The parties will hereafter be referred to as "Plaintiffs" and "Defendant".
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The complaint of the plaintiffs discloses that it is
predicated upon six separate and distinct transactions
covering a period of well over t"\\ 0 years, namely, from
March 24, 1950 to July 1, 1952. Each transaction obviously constitutes a cause of action wholly separate
and distinct from each of the others. For convenience
they will be referred by the dates of their occurrence as
alleged in the complaint as follo,vs : 11arch 2± 1950
' De-'
October 27, 1950, December 4, 1950, ~Jay 17, 1951,
cember 26, 1951, and July 1, 1952. The notes are designated as Exhibits A to F, but are not included in the
exhibits sent to this court, the ex..hibit sheet indicating
that they were withdra"\\rn by plaintiff on ~ ovember 3,
1955, long before this appeal was taken.
7

The representations alleged to have been 1nade by
defendant and upon which plaintiffs predicate the
several causes of action are stated particularly, plaintiffs having amended their complaint at the conclusion
of their evidence to conforn1 to "\vhat they believe to
have been their proof.
Defendant's answer raised, a1nong other defenses,
the denial of any actionable fraud on his part, including a denial of the 1naking of the alleged representations,
and upon the con1plaint and such ans,ver, the case proceeded to jury trial before the Honorable Le,vis Jones.
As each of the transactions constituted a separate and
distinct cause of action, the burden "~as upon the
plaintiffs to prove by clear and convincing evidence,
(Pace v. Parrish, - [Ttah - , 2-17 P. (~) :273), each
of the ele1nents of actionable fraud separately as to
each transaction. These ele1nents have been defined
2
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by this court in the case of Pace v. ParTishJ supra} to
consist of the follovving:
(1)
(2)
(3)
( 4)

That a representation was made;
Concerning a presently existing material fact;
Which was false;
Which the representor either
(a) knew to be false, or
(b) n1ade recklessly, knowing that he had
insufficient knovvledge upon which to base
such representation ;

(5) For the purpose of inducing the other party to
act upon it;
(6) That the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity;
( 7) Did in fact rely upon it;
(8) And was thereby induced to act;
(9) To his injury and damage.
To the end of attempting to prove their case, plaintiffs called the defendant as a witness. Counsel states
(Page 42 of l)laintiffs' Brief) that the defendant was
called and testified under the provisions of Rule 43 (b),
U.R.C.P., but vve submit that such was not the case.
Reference is made to Page 94 of the transcript of
evidence as follows:
"R. C. Duvall, called as a witness in behalf of
plaintiffs, being first duly sworn, was examined
and testified as follows:"
We subn1it that in order to obtain the benefits of
Rule 43 (b), the witness must be expressly called pursuant to the rule, and if he is not so called he is just
3
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another witness for the party calling him. H award v.
Swag art et al, 161 F (2) 651, Johnson v. Baltimore and
0. Ry. Co., 208F (2) 633. Be that as it may, however
his testimony, whether under Rule 43 (b), or otherwise:
was before the jury, and the jury was entitled to accept
it as the truth-which it obviously did.
The facts of the case, as they "\vere presented by
the testimony of competent witnesses, are as follows:
In 1943 Mr. Duvall, the defendant, first becan1e interested in the mining property in question, \Yhich was
located just across the State line in Idaho, and \vhich
is generally referred to as "the mine". It had theretofore been worked to some extent, and test holes and
some 100 to 150 feet of tunneling were in existence. In
1945 he and a Mr. Berrett obtained an option covering
some six or eight claims from the then owner, and later
a lease upon these and "considerably more clain1s" in
the area (Tr. 378-381).
In 1945 they, together with a ~Ir. Froerer \Yho had
also become interested, employed the services of a mining engineer, R. E. Reddin, to explore the property,
and under his direction during the next t\\O years, extensive additional exploratory \York, including dian1ond
drilling, was done. ( Tr. 382-385). Follo,ving the completion of this "Tork, the~T einployed the serYies of Roger
V. Pierce, a consulting 1nining engineer of 'vide experience (Tr. 230, 231), to evaluate the property. Mr.
Pierce arranged for 1\Iiles P. Ro1nney~ a geologist then
employed by U. S. Sn1elting & Refining Co1npany, to
aid in this work. These 111en concluded that still additional exploratory 'vork \vas desirable, and recom4
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mended additional tunneling. Under the direction and
supervision of 1\Ir. Pierce and Mr. Romney considerable
additional tunneling \Vas done, and at its conclusion in
1949 1\Ir. Ron1ney delivered to the defendant a map upon
which vvas reflected the lines of the tunnels, and upon
,vhjch Mr. Romney had further noted the assay values
of the discovered ore. (Tr. 386-397, Tr. 307, 406, 407.)
These values, as so sho,vn by Mr. Romney, ranged
in value from $3.50 per ton to $16.00 per ton. (Tr. 28).
Having thus determined that the ore was present,
these engineers next set about to find out if the gold
eould be recovered therefrom on a profitable basis. To
this end Mr. Pierce submitted samples to General Engineering Company (Tr. 239), and more especially to
American Cynamid Company. Following the making
of extensive tests by American Cynamid Company in
its eastern laboratories it submitted a long written report
to l\!Ir. Pierce, vvhich he in turn submitted to the defendant, together with his own written report and recommendations. These reports are in evidence as Exhibits
lA and 18..
By the report of American Cynamid Company it
appeared that by following the process recommended
by it, gold recoveries of 90% could be had from the ore
from the mine. Pierce's report reflected that there had
been as of that time found in the developed area (which
was but a small part of the mining property), and reasonable extensions beyond developed phases, "200,000 tons
of proven and probable ore reserves having value of
about $7.00 per ton". (Pg. 4 of Exhibit lA). The report
went on to estimate mining costs, milling costs and roy5
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alties totaling $3.28 per ton, which on the basis of 90%
recovery as reported by American Cynamid meant a
profit of $3.02 per ton, or a grand total of $600,000.00
for the 200,000 tons of ore.
Based upon these reports, and the recommendations
of Mr. Pierce and 1Ir. Romney, \vho \vere mining specialists, (Tr. 229-230 and 300-302 as to their qualifications), the defendant determined to atte1npt a mining and
milling operation of the property.
For this purpose a corporation, The Duvall Company, was for1ned in early 1950, with the stock therein
issued primarily to the defendant, and his associates,
~r. Berrett and 1\tfr. Froerer, and to members of their
families.
These three had theretofore put large su1ns of money
into the preliminary work (of which defendant had contributed from $30,000.00 to $35,000.00 (Tr. 466), and
were without additional funds sufficient to defray the
cost of the mill, esti1nated at $80,000.00 (Tr. ±02). The
defendant decided to seek financing for the 1nill from
personal friends and acquaintances of his to the a1nount
of $60,000.00, \vi th hin1self, Berrett and Froerer putting
up the other $20,000.00. The 1noney \Yas to be borro,ved
in the name of the corporation at interest, and as an
added inducen1ent to the lenders, he \vould give them
blocks of stock in the eorporation out of his O\vn holdings. Thus, they \vould be not only creditors, but stockholders. He \vas suecessful in interesting some six
different persons in this prograin "Tho thus loaned the
corporation a total of $60,000.00. The plaintiff loaned
$20,00.00 of this an1ount. The $60,000.00 so raised, with
6
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the $20,000.00 loaned by defendant, Froerer and Berrett
constituted the $80,000.00 estimated as necessary to build
the mill and get it in operation (Tr. 405). This loan of
the plaintiffs is the initial loan they claim was inducted
bY the fraud of defendant, and is referred to as the
transaction of March 24, 1950. It was evidenced by the
note of the corporation payable to plaintiffs, and payable on September 24, 1951. The note is in evidence
as Exhibit A. In addition thereto plaintiffs received
2,400 shares of defendants stock. (Tr. 66, 90, 418).
At the time of the making of this loan plaintiffs
came to defendant's office where he explained the proposition to them and what he had theretofore done by
way of exploration. In this connection he showed Dr.
Douglas the Romney map with Romney's figutes representing ore values. He also showed hi1n the Pierce
report and the American Cynanid report, which they
went over together. He told him that he (the defendant)
was not a mining man, and that reliance had to be upon
the basis of the engineering and laboratory reports (Tr.
409-418). He also discussed with him the other individuals who were considering making loans, and received so1ne suggestions frorn plaintiff ( Tr. 414). He
discussed the fact that Mr. Romney was giving up his
employment with United States Sn1elting and Refining
Company to manage the operation (Tr. 415 ).
He discussed the an1ount of ore that had as of then
been blocked out, and referred to the Pierce report of
200,000 tons. l-Ie discussed the fact that there were
surface ;indications of additional tonnage, and that
greater tonnage n1ight be developed through additional

7
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development work, and that 300,000 tons might be developed (Tr. 422-424). He denied that he stated either in
substance or effect that the Duvall Company had, as a
result of diamond drilling, blocked out not less than
300,000 tons of ore containing gold ranging in value
from four dollars to fifty dollars per ton (as asserted
by plaintiffs). (Tr. 443).
He denied that he stated either in substance or effect
that the ore averaged not less than $7.00 per ton. (Tr.
444).
He denied that he stated in substance or effect
that the total cost of producing the gold from the ore
was less than $3.50 per ton. ( Tr. 444).
He denied that he stated in substance or effect, that
a substantial profit would be realized from mining each
ton of ore. (Tr. 444).
He denied that he then kne'v that 1nining costs would
exceed $3.50 per ton, but testified that he relied on the
report in that regard. (Tr. 444).
He denied that he stated in substance or effect
that no investor would lose a penny. (Tr. 445).
He also denied that he stated in substance or effect
that he would not borrow n1ore 1noney than the con1pany
could pay back out of profits fro1n the proven ore body.
(Tr. 445 ).
Those denial8 "Tere n1ade specifically 'vith respect
to the loan of !farch 2-!-, 1950, and 'vere reiterated with
regard to each subsequent loan. (Tr. 445).
Following the raising of this initial $80,000.00, the
8
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mill was constructed under the direction of Mr. Romney,
and trial runs n1ade in the late summer of 1950, but
returns "\vere low, and to attempt to rectify this Mr.
Pierce and Mr. Romney recommended employing a mining engineer by the name of Val Den1psey. ~Ir. Dempsey
made an extensive study, and recommended incorporating changes into the operation (Tr. 425 ), (Exhibits
4 and 5). Additional moneys were required to meet
then current obligations, and defendant discussed with
~1r. Douglas the matter of raising an additional
$20,000.00 (Tr. 427-428). Mr. Douglas suggested assessing the stockholders, but defendant pointed out to him
that the stock was non-assessable. The money was however raised by further borrowings at that time, plaintiffs putting up $686.20 toward the required arnount,
and defendant $12,000.00. Other stockholders loaned
the balance. To evidence the plaintiffs' loan they received the corporation's note for $686.20, dated October
27, 1950, payable "\vith interest on July 27, 1951. (Exhibit F, Tr. 427-429).
This loan is the second transaction which plaintiffs
claim was induced by defendant's fraud, plaintiffs claiming that despite the fact they received a note to evidence
the loan, and expected to be repaid, and knew the difference between a loan and an assessment, defendant
represented it to them as an assessment. This the defendant specificalJy denied. (Tr. 445).
Because of inclement weather the mill closed down
during the late fall of 1950, and during this period the
engineers worked at trying to devise a process to improve the percentage of gold recoveries. This included

9
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extensive tests at the University of Utah, and tests by
a mining engineer, J. H. Heginbotham. (Tr. 430). Their
recommendations included changes in the mill itself,
(Exhibit 6) and to aid in financing the san1e plaintiffs
made a third loan to the corporation in the amount of
$15,000. This loan was evidenced by a note dated
December 4, 1950, payable August 10, 1951. (Exhibit B).
In addition to the note they also received from defendant 2,400 shares of his stock in the corporation. (Tr. 90).
As of the date of this loan Dr. Douglas was elected to
fill a vacancy on the corporation's board of directors,
and thereafter served and acted as such (Tr. 435).
In connection with this loan defendant denied
specifically that he stated or represented in substance or
effect that the company was doing well, or that it was
shipping considerable ore and making a profit, or that
he had opportunities to sell the mine for in excess of
$2,000,000, or that it 'vas worth more than $2,000,000,
all as asserted by plaintiffs. (Tr. 446-448). He made
like denials 'vith respect to the later loans of May li,
1951, December 26, 1951 and July 1, 1952. (Tr. 446).
Operations "yere reconnnenced at the mine in the
spring of 1951, but in April of that year there was a
fire that destroyed certain of the mining facilities, and
on May 17, 1951, plaintiffs loaned the corporation
$5,000.00 to aid in restoring the1u. They again received
the corporation's note payable July 2, 1951, (Exhibit
C), to evidence the loan, and received from defendant
250 shares of his stoek (Tr. 90, 436-437).
In connection \Vi th the loan of Dece1nber 26, 1951,
defendant further denied specifically that he stated that

10
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the loan would be necessary for a short period of time
only, or until the next shipment of ore was received, all
as asserted by plaintiffs. (Tr. 449).
With the changes in the mill that had been incorporated under the directions of the engineers, gold recoveries still vvere not up to expectation. Accordingly,.
when the mill closed in the fall of 1951, still further
changes vvere recommended to the end of trying to increase these recoveri'es, and to aid therein plaintiffs
n1ade a further loan to the corporation in the amount of
$15,000.00. This loan was evidenced by the note of the
corporation, dated December 26, 1951, payable August
15, 1952 (Exhibit D) and plaintiffs received 2000 shares
of defendant's stock. (Tr. 90, 440).
The final loan of $2,000.00 was made on July 1,
1952, and was made at a time that the company was
having trouble "\vith its well, and had to buy a new pump.
This loan "\vas evidenced by the corporation's note payable October 1, 1952 ( Exhibt E) and plaintiffs received
200 shares of defendant's stock. ( Tr. 90, 443).
No further loans "\Vere made by plaintiffs to the
corporation, but the company continued its mining operations throughout the remainder of 1952, and to N ovember of 1953, at which time it closed. At no time did
plaintiffs ever make demand upon the corporation for
payment of any of the notes (Tr. 82). At the times the
loans of December 26, 1951, and July 1, 1952, were made,
the first four notes were all past due and unpaid.
Following conclusion of the operations for 1953,
the board of directors determined that under the then
11
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existing conditions it would be unwise to attempt further
operations. The defendant testified as to a number of
factors that had interposed since the operation commenced in 1950. These included primarily the outbreak
and continuance of the Korean war 'vith the consequent
sharp increase in costs of labor and materials, and the
inability to derive percentage gold recoveries from the
ore comparable to those obtained by American Cynanid
Company in its laboratory tests and upon ,\~hich the
operation had been based in the first instance. (Tr.
127-130). He further testified that the mine did not run
out of ore, but the proble1n involved mainly the inability
to extract the gold from the ore with percentage recoveries high enough to offset costs. Total tonnage
mined during the four years of the mining operation
was 113,409 tons, and during this period there were
total sales of gold to the United States Mint of $351,250.77 (Exhibit M).
1\fost of the evidence is not in conflict. A conflict
in the evidence did arise to some extent as to whether
the defendant made the representations to plaintiffs
upon 'vhich they rely as grounds for these fraud actions.
Defendant denied categorically that he ever made those
statements, either in substance or effect. Plaintiffs'
testimony, "'"hile far fron1 confor1ning to the pleaded
allegations in this respect, did to so1ne extent conflict
with defendant's testin1ony. The solution to such conflicts, ho,vever, is the object of the jury syste1n, and
the jury that tried these issues found in favor of the defendant. Certainly there is evidence sufficient to support the verdict, whieh evidence is found not only in
the testirnony of the defendant, but also in the corrobo-

12
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rating testimony of the other witnesses for defendant,
and particularly in the cross examination of the plaintiff, F. E. Douglas.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
Plaintiffs present their statement of points under
som·e five headings for the purpose of argument. We
will answer them in the same order.
ARGU~IENT

I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMITTING
THE MATTER TO THE JURY UPON SPECIAL
INTERROGATORIES.
At the outset it is to be observed that plaintiffs
elected to plead six separate and distinct causes of action
as a single cause, and resisted defendants efforts that
they be required to separately state then1. Ho\vever,
as each transaction was separate and distinct, the burden
\vas on the plaintiffs as to any single transaction to
prove by clear and convincing proof the nine elements
essential to actionable fraud. Those nine elements were
determined by this Court in the case of Pace v. Parrish,
supra, and are hereinbefore set out at page 3 hereof.
In submitting the case to the jury the court was
accordingly confronted with the task of presenting it
in such a way that the jury would find the issues, i.e.,
the essential elements, as to each transaction without
regard to its findings as to any other transaction, for
it is obvious that a finding as to one transaction \Vould
be of no significance as to another transaction. To meet

13
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this difficult problem the court elected, as well it might
under· Rule 49, U.R.C.P., to utilize the procedure of
special interrogatories, and to require the jury to find
.
'
e1ther yes or no, as to each elen1ent essential to each
transaction. Thus it submitted an interrogatory separately as to each element and as to each transaction.
The court could do no less, because if the jury answered
"No" to any interrogatory it would have the effect of
defeating plaintiffs' cause of action as to that transaction only, leaving plaintiffs' remaining causes untouched by the effect of that particular negative answer.
The Court could not, of course anticipate any negative answers, so it was obliged to submit interrogatories
as to each elen1ent of each transaction down to and including the final element of damages.
True it is, that in submitting special interrogatories
in the manner the court did, "Then the jury reached a
negative answer to any transaction, that was the end of
it, and there 'vas no necessity for the jury to answer any
further as to that transaction. In the instant case the
jury answered the first interrogatory as to each transaction, i. e., with regard to the making of the representations, in the negative, and there 'Yas no need for the
jury to go further, and the court so instructed them
(Instruction 3 ( 8) R. 50). However, as evidence of
what they thought of the total in1propriety of plaintiffs'
law suit, and despite the fact that they gave a negative
answer to each of the first interrogatories and so found
the representations \\'"ere not 1nade, they 'vent on and
found each and every of the ren1aining elements of
actionable fraud against the plaintiffs. Because of this,

14
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plaintiffs assert an inconsistency exists in the answers
of the jury, in that it is inconsistent, for example, for
the jury to have answered first that the representations
were not made, and second, to have further answered
that they were not false.
We do not agree that inconsistencies thus exist.
While it was unnecessary for the jury, having found that
the representations were not made, to make any further
findings as to that transaction, it was not inconsistent
form them so to do so long as the further findings were
all in the negative. If a representation was not made, it
could not, in the very nature of things, be false, or have
been material, or have been relied upon, etc. It is only
if there had been a subsequent affirmative answer that
any contention of inconsistency could be urged. We
submit, accordingly, that there was no inconsistency in
complete negative answers to all of the interrogatories,
and the cases cited by plaintffs have no application to
the instant case.
As pointed out by this court in the case of Pace v.
Parrish, supra,
"Wherever there is uncertainty or doubt in connection with the correlation of interrogatori'es
with each other and their an:.~nvers, they should
be so interpreted as to harmonize with the findings of the jury if that can reasonably be done."
Certainly there is no difficulty in harmonizing the subsequent negative answers with the first, and plaintiffs'
contention is without merit.
Plaintiffs further urge that there was no issue upon
the matter of reliance, because plaintiffs testified they

15
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did rely. The mere fact that they so testified does not
remove the issue, as there were many other factors
that the jury was entitled to consider in connection with
the question of reliance. There is the fact that plaintiff Dr. Douglas, was intimately associated with the
project from the first, (Tr. 465) his visits to the n1ine,
(Tr. 318, 465) his conferences with the operating n1anager, (Tr. 318) the fact that the company \vas frequently
in need of additional funds, the fact of his directorship,
(Tr. 131, 132, 458) the fact that he was making loans
when he held already past due notes, (Tr. 78, 82) and a
multitude of other matters. (Tr. 462-464) Certainly
the jury \vas justified in disbelieving his affirmation
of reliance in the light of all these other circun1stances.
Further than that, however, is the fact that as the jury
found on competent evidence that the representations
were not made, he could not, despite his protestations
of reliance, have relied upon son1ething that did not
exist.
Plaintiffs' final contention under this point is that
the court did not give their requested instructions 3
and 4. Instruction 3 relates to defendant's position in
the community as an inducen1ent to plaintiffs to lend
their 1noney, and Instruction 4 to bad 1noti\Te. The full
and con1plete ans\\~er to this contention is that the failure to give the instructions, \Yhether the~~ \Yere proper
or not, was not prejudicial to plaintiffs. These requests
had nothing \vhateYer to do w·ith \Yhether the representations \Yere 1uade, and the jury having found that they
\vere not n1ade, any question of position in the comntunity, 1notive or anything else becon1es wholly incon-
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sequential, and any error in connection therewith, assuming it did exist, is non-prejudicial.
The sole material issue is whether the court was
justified in subn1itting to the jury the question of
·whether the representations \Vere made. As to this,
there is no contention that there was not sufficient evidence fron1 defendant's standpoint to go to the jury, or
that the finding of the jury is not supported by competent evidence. Such being the case, the manner of
submission of the other possible issues, including instructions thereon, is of no consequence, because if the
representations \Vere not made, and the jury so found
as a fact, there were and are no other issues in the case.
Other assertions made by plaintiffs under this point
of argument should not go unchallenged, although \vholly
immaterial in the light of the finding by the jury that
the clai1ned representations \Vere not n1ade. For example, plaintiffs assert (Pg. 13 of their brief) that the
Pierce Report disclosed "that there was no ore of co1n1nercial value on the property". On the contrary this
report shows on its face that in Pierce's opinion there
was a profit of not less than $600,000.00 to be made
from the then blocked out ores (Exhibit lA, Page 4).
They assert that the alleged representation that
there was 300,000 tons of ore blocked out by diamond
drilling was of material significance. Certainly this
court will recognize that the only material issue on ore
tonnage was \Vhether the ore \Vas there, not whether it
·was blocked out, and 1nuch less whether it \vas blocked
out by diamond drilling as distinguished from tunnelling or some other exploratory method. Further, the
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question of whether it was represented that there was
200,000 tons or 300,000 tons completely loses any significance in view of the fact that the operation ultimately closed down after having mined only 113,409
tons, and for reasons completely disassociated fron1 any
question of whether there were 200,000 or 300,000 tons.
And finally, there was absolutely no proof of falsitv of
the existence of 300,000 tons assuming that much was
represented.
ol

Plaintiffs also assert that the court erred in failing
to give their requ'ested instruction No. 4 charging that
bad motive is not an essential element of fraud.
We submit · that the court presented all of the
essential elements to the jury, and having submitted
the essential elements there was no duty to go further
and instruct on "'\Vhat were not ele1nents. Further than
that, there was and could be no prejudice in view of the
jury's finding that no representations were made.
Finally plaintiffs complain generally because, as
they put it, the court did not instruct fully and conlpletel~,. upon the la\\T of fraud. \\'ithout conceding that
the court so failed, "'\Ye sub1nit that by the use of the
sp·ecial interrogatories any need for full and complete
instructions upon the la"'\Y generally \vas eliminated.
That is one of the functions of the use of special interrogatories.

In JJloores Fcde1·al Practice, r:rolznne 5, Page 2207,
the author, in eonunenting on the use of general instructions in connection \\Tith ipecial interrogatories or special
verdicts under Rule 49, observes:

18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Use of the special verdict elemina tes the necessity for and use of complicated instructions on
the law, which are a normal concomitant of the
general verdict. * * *. When the special verdict
is used the court should give the jury only such
explanation and instructions as it deems necessary to enable the jury to 1nake intelligent findings upon the issues of fact submitted."
H

In 88 C.J.S. Trial, Page 952, it is thus stated:
"Where special issues are submitted or a special
verdict is required, it is in1proper to instruct the
jury on the law of the case, and only sufficient
instructions as to the general law should be given
as will enable the jury to answer the questions
intelligently."
And in 53 Anz. Jur, Trial, Page 638:
"'Where a special verdict is required, it is improper to instruct the jury generally concerning
the la'v of the case, for the reason that inasmuch
as the jury are not to apply the la\Y to the facts,
instructions as to the law can serve no useful
purpose."

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
This is a continuation to some extent to some of
the matters considered under Point I. Plaintiffs here,
however, make further claims of error in regard to the
instructions, which we will anwer specifically.
Plaintiffs first contend that the court should have
instructed the jury that they should find the representations were made if made in "substance and effect".
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An examination of the record will show the lack of
merit to the contention.
Plaintiffs' original complaint was based upon definite and specific representations affirmatively asserted
to have been made. (R. 1-2). At the conclusion of their
evidence they amended their complaint to assert other
and further representations. (R. 23-25). In neither
instance did they plead or attempt to plead "substance
or effect". No written request for a "substance and
effect" instruction was made by the plaintiffs, but on
the contrary they requested the following:
"Plaintiffs Requested Instruction No. 6.
"You are instructed that the plaintiffs have
charged the defendant with making several false
and fraudulent representations. In this connection, it is not necessary that the plaintiffs prove
that each and all of such representations vvere
made, or that all of sueh representations were
false. It is sufficient, if the plaintiffs prove by a
fair preponderance of the endence that any one
1
.
:J!: * * ."
of sue h represen t.at tons
u·as rna de t o f t~;enz.,
(Italics added).
Passing the fact that the request is bad from the
standpoint of the character of proof required, i. e. clear
and convincing proof, it evidences that plaintiffs conc·eived throughout that they 1nust prove so1ne or all
of the representations asserted by them. Under these
circumstances it is obvious that the court did not err
in failing to givP n substance and effect instruction that
they not only did not request, but 'vhich would have
been contrary to 'Yhat they did request.
Plaintiffs next urge that the court erred in failing
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to give its Requested Instruction No. 12, to the effect
that a representation once made would thereafter continue outstanding until retracted by the defendant or
until the plaintiffs "had actual knowledge" that such
repres'entations \Vas false. The part of the request in
quotes is sufficient in and of itself to make the request
a misstatement of the law and thus justify its rejection,
as a reasonable means of knowledge, as distinguished
fro1n actual knowledge, is all that the law requires,
(Taylor v. Moore, 87 Utah 493, 51 P. (2) 222), but.
further than that the court did instruct on the matter
ofplaintiffs' reliance as follows:
"In connection with that question, it is the plaintiffs' theory of the case that these representations,
if any you find, \vere continuing after the first
incident. So in considering this matter of reliance
and other questions asked you, you may give
consideration to the question of vvhether or not
these representations, if 1nade at all, \Vere of a
continuing nature, so that the plaintiffs may have
had them in mind, if that be the case, on subsequent transactions." (R. 49).
We submit, accordingly, that the request as made
was bad on its face, and, further than that, the part
that was good was given.
Further, in connection with this asserted ·error,
plaintiffs claim that defendant, after he learned from
experience in the operation of the mine that the engineer's estimates of ore values, costs of production and
percentage recoveries were in error, had a duty to
disclose these facts to plaintiffs. We submit that immediately upon the defendant's acquisition of this know-
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ledge it was communicated to plaintiffs, and each and
every loan made by them was made in the light of this
knowledge. The matters were, of course, discussed at
directors' meetings, which plaintiff Dr. Douglas at~
tended as a director, commencing February 15, 1951.
(Tr. 458-462-464), but in addition thereto, and commencing with the summer of 1950, and before a second loan
was made, Dr. Douglas was receiving and continued to
receive full information with regard to the operations,
including ore values, production costs and recoveries.
(Tr. 465, 466, 491, 495, 498, 499) He and defendant made
weekly, or bi-weekly, trips to the mine together, discussed the problems ·with the operating manager and
consulting engineers, and the record is replete with
testimony to the effect that Douglas 'vas fully informed
and at all times knew that production costs were up and
recoveries down from those originally anticipated, that
profits were not being realized, and that moneys additional to operating revenues "~ere required. Thus, while
there 1nay have been a duty to disclose changing conditions, the record sho,Ys, and the jury well believed,
that duty " ..as fully discharged, and the plaintiffs made
their loans "-ith full kno"-ledge of all of the facts.
Plaintiffs next assert error in that the court instructed the jury that Dr. Douglas w·as a director, when
that fact "Tas in dispute. The fact of the matter is that
Dr. Douglas "-as appointed to the board as a director on
D·ecen1ber 4, 1950, to fill a vaeanry, and "-as elected a
director at the next annual n1eeting. (Tr. 131, 132).
He thereaftt'r 8l\rYed as a direr.tor throughout the company's opPrations, and nt•ver questioned but that he was
a direetor until after this suit """as brought. Then his
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only contention was that he was not a director because
his oath of office had not been filed with the County
Clerk. Whether he was a de jure director is not important, for certainly he 'vas acting as such, and as such
had available to hin1 all corporate information. As
stated in Barnes v. Eastern and Western Lumber Co.,
(Ore.) 28'7 P (2) 929:

''Accordingly it was the duty of ~Irs. Spangler,
as a director, to keep herself informed concerning the assets and activities of the Eastern ~"
Western Lu1nber Con1pany."
Beyond that, the court didn't instruct thejury that he
was a director, but on the contrary, in commenting in
its instructions on what a reasonable person should observe and learn, stated:

"* * * And that's especially true, 1frs. Nylander
and gentlemen of the jury, if the person happens
to hold the high office of director in a corporation." (Italics added).
The foregoing demonstrates that there was and is
no error in the court instructions as asserted by plaintiffs. We again reiterate, however, that even though
there 'vas error, it is non-prejudicial in the light of the
jury's finding against the plaintiffs on the matter of
whether the representations were or were not made.
POINT III.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ANY C011MENTS
BY IT UPON THE EVIDENCE DURING THE
COURSE OF ITS INSTRUCTIONS.
The asserted error here lies in phraseology used
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by the court in its instruction on· reliance or right of
reliance by plaintiffs, i. e., did the plaintiffs rely and
have the right to rely upon the representations claimed
by them to have been made by defendant.
The error relied upon appears in those portions of
the instructions set out at pages 31 and 32 of plaintiffs'
Brief, and plaintiffs contend the effect thereof was to
instruct the jury that the Court believed plaintiffs had
knowledge of the affairs of the corporation or means
of knowledge. We submit that the language of the court
cannot be so tortured. What the court said, and all it
said, was (1) that plaintiffs \Yere obliged to observe and
learn what a reasonable person \Vould observe and learn,
and (2) that "ras especially true of corporate matters,
if the person \Vas a director of the corporation, and (3)
that if the jury found that the plaintiffs didn't observe
or learn "\Vhat a reasonable person should have, there
could be no recovery because there \vas no reliance or
right of reliance.
We sub1nit that there \vas no connuent on the evidence itself by the court, but only a fair and accurate
statement of the la'v as it pertained to plaintiffs' reliance.
Again, any error in instructions on the matter of
reliance, if 01Tor ·existed, 'vas of necessity cured by the
jury finding no representations \\"'ere n1ade, and hence
there "Tas nothing upon \Yhich reliance could be had.

POINT I,T.
THE COURT l)ID NOT ERR IN R,EFlTSING TO ALLOW COUNSEL TO READ EXCERPTS FROM A
TRANSCRII)T OF DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY
24
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DURING FINAL ARGUMENT.
Plaintiffs' argun1ent on this point is from the standpoint that their counsel had the absolute right to read
from the reporter's partial transcript of defendant's
testimony in his argument to the jury, yet the cases
he cites in support thereof all demonstrate that the
granting or denial of such permission is 'vithin the
discretion of the trial court.
As appears fro1n the record herein, the testimony
of the defendant comprises some 226 pages of the transcript, of which some 76 pages \vere as a witll'ess for plaintiffs. During the course of the argu1nent plaintiffs' counsel proposed to read to the jury a portion of defendant's
testin1ony given on behalf of plaintiffs' case, which
\vould, of course, constitute but a n1inor fraction of his
entire testimony. Counsel for defendant objected to
such reading contending that it would be prejudicial,
and particularly so if but excerpts from the whole \Vere
to be read. The objection was sustained, and we submit
properly so. So far as \Ve have been able to ascertain
the authorities are unani1nous in their holdings that this
is so1nething that is within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and some courts take the view that reading
from a transcript is of doubtful propriety. Even the
text from American Jurisprudence quoted by plaintiffs
(Page 38 of their Brief) does not support plaintiffs'
position, for all it says is that counsel "may repeat the
evidenee verbatim" or he may "refresh his recollection
of the testimony by reading frorn the notes of the official
reporter". Neither, of course is the same as reading to
the jury from a purported transcript.
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The general rule on the subject, as we have determined it, is as stated at 88 C.J.S. Trial, Page 347:
"It is within the sound discretion of the trial
court to permit, or to refuse to permit counsel to
read to the jury from a transcript of the stenographers notes."
The following cases support the foregoing rule of
law, and while they are not exhaustive upon the subject,
do reflect the rule unanimously adopted by the courts
which have had an opportunity to pass thereon:
Chicago I. & L. Ry. Co. vs. Gorn~an (Ind) 106
N. E. 897.

"Appellant's attorney, while 1naking his argmnent
to the jury, produced a paper which he stated
was a copy of the testimony given by said witness
on cross-examination, and which he proposed to
read to the jury * * * As evidence is heard in a
cause, it is presumed that its essential features
are at that time lodged in the memories of the
jurors. When the hearing of evidence has been
finally closed, any practice is at least of doubtful
propriety the purpose of "~hich is by some subsequent procedure to make a primary iinpression
of the facts in the case upon the 1ninds of the
jurors. * • * In the trial of a eause many
1natters 1nust of n~ressity be conunitted to the
sound discretion of the trial court. He is in the
midst of the lornl situation. The trial court was
better able than is this court to deter1nine whether
or not the use of such transeript \Yas likely to
hav-e sonH\ un"Tarranted or iinproper effect. We,
thereforP l1old that the question presented here
e:une \Vi thin the rea1rn of the sound discretionary
power of the trial court. Tl1ere is nothing to
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indicate that such discretion was abused, or that
appellant suffered any injury from the court's
ruling.''
Wells Fargo & Co. Express v. W. B. Baker Lumber Co. (.Ark) 171 8. W. 132.

"There was no prejudicial error in the ruling of
the court in refusing to permit the counsel to
read excerpts from the deposition, nor in the
remarks of the court giving his reason for such
ruling. It is within the sound discretion of the
court to grant or refuse permission to read ·excerpts from depositions of witnesses that have
been read in evidence to the jury. * * * While the
court might very properly have permitted the
counsel to read the extracts he desired to read
in order to show that he was stating the testimony correctly, the court did not err in refusing
this permission and in thus leaving the Inatter
to the recollection of the jury who had heard the
reading of the deposition."
McConkie

1:.

Babcock, Iou'a 70 N. W. 103.

"It seems to us, of necessity, the right to read
any part or portion of the evidence of a 'vi tness
which is given in the case on trial to the jury
must be a matter largely within the discretion
of the trial judge; and we ~hould not be justified
in reversing a cause, because of a ruling of the
trial judge relating thereto, unless it is reasonably
clear that he has abused his discretion to the
prejudice of the complaining party. * * * Holding, as we do, that it is a rnatter resting in the
sound discretion of the trial judge, we see no
reason in this case for holding that his ruling was
erroneous."
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Westling v. Holm (Minn.) 58 N. W. (2) 252.
"(6) We have held that reading parts of testimoney from a court reporter's transcript thereof
is permissible in the discretion of the trial court.
Aasen v. Aasen, 228 Minn. 1, 36 N. W. 2d 27;
Bonderson v. Hovde, 150 1\finn. 175, 184 N. W.
853. As stated in the Aasen case, 228 lVlinn. 7 36
N. W. 2d 31:

' * * * the conduct of a trial generally rests
in the discretion of the trial court. This includes the practice of reading to the jury
excerpts from the court reporter's transcript.'"

Gephart v. Stout (Wash.) 118 P. (2) 801.
"It is within the sound discretion of the trial
court to permit, or to refuse to pern1it, counsel
in his argument to read matter to the jury from
a transcript of the stenographer's notes."

Smith v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (Wash.) 140 P.
685.
"How many times a witness 1nay be recalled on
a particular matter, or how many tin1es his evidence may be repeated to the jury, rests in the
sound discretion of the court, to be revie,ved only
for abuse. Here "\Ye find no abuse of discretion.
The attorney "\Vas not denied the right to refresh
his memory from the stenographic notes, or from
any memorandum he 1nay have 1nade of the evidence other,Yi~e, nor "Tas he denied the right of
stating to the jury his re1nernbrance of the testimony of any witness, nor fro1n dra"\Ying any
deduction or conrlusion he chose to draw therefron1. He 'vas denied only the right to doing
what amounted virtually to a recall of the wit28
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ness and have him repeat to the jury what he
had testified on a particular matter. Doubtless
in the interests of truth and justice the trial judge
Inay permit such a practice ; but it does not belong
to either litigant to demand it as an absolute
right."
The comments of the court in Smith v. Northern
Pac. Ry. Co., supra, appear particularly applicable here.
Plaintiffs' counsel was not precluded from refreshing
his own recollection from the transcript, and it is to
be assum·ed that he had done so as he had it in his possession and had determined just what parts he wanted
to read, and what to exclude, nor 'vas he denied the
right of stating to the jury what the testimony of the
'vitness 'vas after having refreshed his recollection, or
from drawing any deduction or conclusion therefrom
that he chose. He was denied only the privilege of doing
'vhat amounted virtually to a recall of a witness, after
all of the testimony was in and both sides had rested,
to the end of having a portion of his testimony repeated.
Any permission to read less than the whol'e of the testimony would result, through the action of the court in
granting the permission, in the undue emphasizing of
the portions read to the exclusion of the portions not
read. Error might well result from the granting of
such permission, but never from its refusal.

POINT V.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS
ON THE TRANSACTION OF DECEMBER 4, 1950.
Plaintiffs do not argue that they were entitled to
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a directed verdict as to all of the transactions, but only
as to the one of December 4, 1950. Consideration of
this point presents the opportunity to defendant of
demonstrating not only that plaintiffs were not entitled
to this directed verdict, but that defendant was entitled
to and should have been granted a directed verdict as
to all transactions.
1.

The representations.

The representations relied upon were as follows,
albeit all were not asserted as to each cause of action:
(a) 300,000 tons were blocked out;
(b) ranging in value from $4.00 to $50.00 per ton,
with average value of $7.00 p·er ton;
(c) costs of producing the gold of $3.50 per ton;
(d) a substantial profit would be realized;
(e) no investor would lose a penny;
(f) would not borrovv more than company could
repay out of profits;
(g) the company was doing well ;
(h) shipping considerable ore;
(i) realizing a profit;
( j) loan necessary for a short time only;
(k) opportunity to sell mine for $2,000,000 but mine
worth more than that.
As this court has held on many occasions, a representation to be actionable 1nust be as to a present material fact, and n1ust be rnaterially false, and the burden
of proof is on the plaintiffs. Statements as to future
events, or of opinion, are not actionable.
For exarnple in the ca~ of Ackerman v. Bt·attn.well
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Investment Company, 80 Utah 52, 12 P. (2) 623, plaintiff purchased a third party's note from defendant. The
note subsequently proved to be worthless, and plaintiff
sought to recover its value from defendant on the ground
that it had been 1nisrepresented. Among the representations relied upon were "the note was good as gold",
and "the defendant T~vould see that plaintiff didn't lose a
penny on the note". This court there said:
"The representations that the note was 'good as
gold' and that the Investment Company (defendant) would see that the plaintiff 'did not lose a
penny' in and of themselves are Inatters of mere
opinion, exagerated statements, and trade talk,
and are not actionable."
In Kinnear v. Prows, 81 Utah 135, 16 P. (2) 1094,
among the representations relied upon were (a) the
company owned property worth $55,000, (b) the company was doing well and was a paying business, (c) the
stock was good as gold, and (d) the company paid dividends of 10%. In commenting upon these representations the court said :
"It is apparent fro1n a reading of the alleged
representations relied on that many of thern were
mere expressions of opinion which do not constitute actionable fraud~"
The court singled out the representation that the
company was paying dividends as being a statement of a
present material fact which if false and relied on, would
be actionable.
In Hull v. Flinders, 83 Utah 158, 27 P. (2) 56, there
were included representations that the company was
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"safe as any bank in Ogden" and "its bonds were as
good as gold coin". They were construed to be mere
expressions of opinion and not actionable.

In Campbell v. Zions Coop Home Building & Real
Estate Co. 46 Utah 1, 148 P. 401, the court said:
"The statements that investors 'vill 'get handsome returns,' that their 'investments will be
safe,' that 'fortunes had been 1nade in the same
line,' that the 'stock was worth a dollar a share
and would double in value,' that purchasers 'could
not lose, took no chance,' that if they ''Yere dissatisfied with their stock the con1pany "\vould buy
it back at par,' and staten1ents concerning the
mere worth or value of the defendant's holdings
or assets, future costs and expenses of operation,
future profits to be derived from the business,
or from the purchase of stocks or other investments, the future ability of the defendant to pay
dividends, and other similar expressions and
statements, that 'the purchase of 5,000 shares
would make the purchaser independent for life,
would not have to work any more,' that 'this is
the biggest thing I ever knew in 1ny life, the
biggest in the state, the best thing ever sold, a
n1ighty good thing,' and other similar statements
and expressions are 1nere opinions, beliefs, future
pron1ises, assurances, or happenings, or 'trade
talk' and 'puffings,' and not, in then1selves, actionable."
From the face of the record, assuming the representations were 1nade as alleged (the jury finding to the
contrary), the following is apparent:
Representation (a) is not 1naterial, as it is 1ncon32
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sequential whether the ore was blocked out or not, the
ilnportant thing being \vhether it was there, and there
was no allegation or proof, nor attempt by plaintiffs to
prove, that there were not available 300,000 tons of ore
on the properties. Further than that as operations
discontinued after the 1nining of 113,000 tons, it is of
no consequence \vhether there are 87,000 tons left, or
187,000 tons.
Representation (b) was not proven false. It is
without contradiction that assays showed a spread in
value vvithin the range indicated. Tons mined were
slightly below the average in value, but there was but
a fraction of the total tonnage extracted.
Representations (c) an (d) were but opinions when
originally made, later corrected to plaintiffs' knowledge.
Representations (e) and (f) were but opinions.
Representation (g) is so relative as to be meaningless, and is further but an op1n1on. In other words,
"doing well" in comparison to what~
Representation (h) \vas not proven false. In fact
its truth is established by the fact that 113,000 tons were
1nined and process'ed, and over $350,000.00 worth of
gold shipped to the 1nint.
Representation (i) could have no application to the
first transaction, as the company then was, to plaintiffs'
own knowledge, not in operation, and as to subsequent
transactions was contrary to plaintiffs' O\Vn kno,vledge
of the facts.
Representations (j) and (k) are but expressions of
opinion.
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Thus none of the representations alleged to have
been made were actionable, either becauS'e they were
but expressions of opinion, or because the plaintiffs
knew the contrary, or because their falsity was not
established.
A further reason why no prima facie cause of action
was proven as to any transaction is because of the complete absence of any proof of dan1age. A fraud action
is unlike other tort actions in that damage is an elen1ent
of tlre offense itself, and must be proven the same as
the other elements, and by the same clear and convincing proof. Kinnear v. Prows) supra.
Plaintiffs' contention, and their only proof, was
that as the Duvall Company became insolvent and
liquidated in the late fall of 1953, and as a consequenC'e
was then unable to pay its notes to plaintiffs (and
others), plaintiffs ipso facto were damaged as a consequence of defendant's alleged fraud to the full antount
of the unpaid notes) plus accrued interest thereon.
These notes, by their terms, 1natured fron1 over one
year to over two years prior to the time the company
discontinued its operations. The latest maturing note
was that of July 1, 1952, \Vhich matured October 1, 1952,
and the earlier notes matured in the sunnner of 1951.
No demand was ever 1nade by plaintiffs for their payment, nor any proof offered by plaintiffs to show that
the company wouldn't or couldn't have paid at 1naturity.
In fact the testimony affirinat~ely shows a continuing
operation fron1 over t'vo years after the earlier notes
matured, to over one year after n1aturity of the last
note. True it is that during this period the con1pany
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was to soin'e extent operating on borro"\ved money (although Exhibit l\1 reflects that in 1952 the company had
receipts from ore sales amounting to $99,239.71, and in
1953 amounting to $169,131.20), and payment of plaintiffs' notes, if pay1nent had been den1anded, might well
have been from other borrowings, but this is certainly
of no significance. 11any operating businesses pay their
1naturing obligations from borrowed capital. Nor does
the evidence shovv that the ultimate liquidation proximately followed fron1 the falsity of any actionable representation but on the contrary the record discloses
(Tr. 127-130) that it was the constantly rising costs of
materials and labor following the commencement of the
Korean War, inability to make percentage recoveries
in accordance with laboratory tests, and a combination
of circumstances that finally forced the close down.
This court has held, Kinnear v. Prows, supra, Pace
v. Parrish, supra, that the 1neasure of damages in a
fraud action is the difference in value as of the time of
the fraud, of the property received by plaintiffs, and
the value the property \vould have had if defendant's
representations had been true. In other words, in the
instant case, the difference in the value of these notes
when received by plaintiffs, and their then value had
defendant's alleged representations been true.
Thus the element of damages in this case required
proof by the plaintiffs that at the time they received
each of such notes, the actual value thereof was in fact
less than the face a1nount thereof. No proof whatever
was made or offered along these lines, but on the contrary plaintiffs offered only to prove that the co1npany
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was unable to pay them from over one to nearly three
years later by reason of its then insolvency, resulting
from a combination of factors in no wise related to the
alleged representations.
In Hecht v. Metzler, 14 Utah 408, this court announced th'e rule to be in a fraud action:
"With reference to damages, the case must he
tried just as it would have been tried the daY
after the contract was made, if the question had
arisen at that time."
Assuming for the sake of the argument that in the
case of promissory notes, the time of determining value
is as of their maturity date, rather than date of delivery,
(although we find no authority to support this assumption) there is absolutely no evidence 'vhatever that their
then value was less than their face value. The fact that
the co1npany continued operations from one to two years
after the notes matured, with operating incon1e during
the two years approximating $270,000., indicates that
the then value of these notes ''"as not less than their
face value. On the other hand, the only proof, or offer
of proof, by the plaintiffs relating to value of the notes,
was that at some 1nuch later date the co1npany becan1e
insolvent, and so couldn't pay then1.
As stated in Kinnear v. Prows, supra:
"There is no PYidence 'vhatever of the real or
market value of this stock at the tin~e it ,zra.s transferred to plaintiffs, or of the financial condition
of the con1pany, and hence no eYidence of injury
or da.Inage by reason of such false repre~enta
tions. We cannot prcszone the val~te to be les~
36
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

than represented because it might well be that
earnings of the corporation, if any, remained in
the treasury or \\Tei·e used to extend and develop
the property and business of the corporation, in
which event the value of the stock might be equal
to or greater than as represented. * * *. With
respect to this particular item there was therefore
no sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the
question of injury or damage." (Italics added)

Not dissimilar to our case on this point was that of
Menefee v. Blitz, (Ore.) 179 P. (2) 550, albeit in that
cas'e oil was involved instead of gold, and corporate
stock instead of corporate notes. Upon the subject of
value, the court said:
"The evidence indicates, in our opinion, that the
stock possessed value on the day of its purchase.
We shall now recite the facts upon which we
base that state1nent. The stock under consideration vvas issued by a corporation which was
seeking to extract hidden treasure, in the form
of oil, from the bowels of the earth. It rnight
develop that there was no oil in the stratum for
'vhich the drill \\T<ls headed, but the things which
man hopes he vvill find in the unkno,vn often
lend to a project rnore value than the things
which he actually possesses. The corporation
in which the respondent bought his stock was
following a plan of action which was devised by
a competent geologist; the latter was in charge
of the drill. At the beginning it was thought
that oil in large quantities would be found in the
Vaqueros sand and that the latter would be encountered at a depth of about 3,000 feet. It was
assumed, however, that it rnight be necessary to
go down much deeper. When the respondent
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purchased his stock, the drill had not yet reached
the Vaqueros sand. When the drilling stopped
in September, 1937, hopes of discovering oil had
not been abandoned. They \Yere still entertained
notwithstanding discouraging developrnents. The
cessation of activities was 'because they ran out
of money and the equipn1ent was no good.' Those
are the words of the respondent himself."
We submit, accordingly, that not only were the
plaintiffs not entitled to any directed verdict but on
the face of the record from the damage standpoint alone,
defendant was entitled to a directed verdict as to each
transaction in accordance with his motion therefor (Tr.
590).
Now, specifically as to the transaction of December 4, 1950, which plaintiffs assert should have been
the subject of a directed verdict in their favor. In this
connection they argue that "\vhen this loan \Vas n1ade
defendant then knew by experience that the engineers
estimates of ore values and production costs \vere in
error, and that in failing to disclose that error he conlmitted actionable fraud.
What, however, are the facts? The facts are that
the mill was completed and placed in partial operation
in August, 1950. Bet\Yeen that date and "Then it closed
for the winter in Noven1ber, a few trial runs "\Yere made.
The ore that was run \vas \vithin the 1ninimum value
of $3.50 or $4.00, so there \Vas no falsity there. Bugs
developed in the operation of the n1ill, as often happens
in any new operation of this type, and as a consequence
production costs \vere up and recoveries do\vn, but the
engineers imn1ediately recon1mended changes and alter38
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ations in the mill vvhich they believed would rectify the
trouble and bring costs and recoveries within their
original estimates. Certainly it cannot be said that the
defendant then knew that these engineers, among the
top in their fields, would be unable to produce the results they had said they could. On the contrary defendant had implicit faith and trust in their ability, and,
in fact, had backed it up by putting another $12,000.00
of his own 1noney in on October 27, 1950. And further
than that, as previously pointed out, plaintiffs through
their frequent trips to the mine during the summer
and fall of 1950, and through their discussions with the
operating engineer and with defendant, were fully apprised of the difficulties that attended these first ore
runs through the mill, and of the plans to atte1npt to
correct them. These facts \Vere all brought home to
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs r.a.ay not deny that on December 4, 1950, they were not completely informed thereof.

CONCLUSION
As this court has heretofore recognized (State v.
Seymour, 49 Utah 285, 163 P. 789.) disappointrnent frequently follows investments having for their ultimate
object the extraction of the earth's treasures, and this
is particularly so of those undertakings of a speculative
nature. Returns of the contemplated enterprise may
fall far below expectations of the prornoters, regardless
of their honesty of purpose and integrity. Prime examples of this characteristic of the speculative venture
are to he found in the current rise and fall in the values
of oil and uraniun1 securities.
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Thus it is that when an enterprise fails, or encounters less than anticipated success, charges of misrepresentation and fraud are easily made by those who
are willing only to ride with the winners. Words and
phrases honestly used to describe the nature, object8 and
purposes of the enterprise are seized upon and torn
from context, and twisted and tortured for the sole purpose of making them appear ugly and deceitful and
fraudulent. So it is that in actions of this type the law
requires clear and convincing proof of the alleged fraud,
and carefully scrutinizes the evidence upon \vhich the
complainant relies for recovery.
The record in this case is long and somewhat tedious
to read. It does disclose, however, affirmatively and
beyond doubt, that defendant's actions and conduct toward plaintiffs was at all time above reproach. Before
embarking on any operation that required funds over
and beyond those that he and his associates, Barrett
and Froerer, were able to contribute, he procured the
assistance of men and organizations 'vho were experts
in the field, Pierce, Romney and the testing laboratories
of American Cynamid Corporation. If error \Yas present in their conclusions as to the feasibility of the project, the error was theirs and they ackno,vledged it.
After trial runs during the first year disclosed that
results were not up to expectations, the assistance and
advice of these experts was continued, and additional
exp'erts, Den1psey and Heiginbothan1, 'vere called in.
Plaintiff F. E. Douglas not only had the means of kno,vledge as to :everything that "Tas going on by virtue of
acting as a director of the corporation, but had actual
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knowledge thereof through direct conversations with
defendant and the operating managers of the company.
When plaintiffs' earlier loans matured, they not only
did not press for payment thereof, but continued to
rnake further loans, and it was only when the company,
fro1n one to two years later, was forced to liquidate
for reasons no one foresaw or could have forseen, that
plaintiffs first raised the cry of fraud and deceit.
These matters were all before the jury. The jurors
saw and heard the actual testimony of plaintiffs and
defendant, were cognizant of the conflict therein, and
formed their own opinions of wherein lay the truth.
Fifty-four interrogatories were propounded to them,
each one directed specifically to an essential ·element
of the alleged fraud, and fifty-four negative answers
were the response. Six negative answers-one to each
transaction-would have been sufficient, but the jury,
having heard the evidence, was disinclined to per1nit any
factual facet of the case to go unanswered.
We submit that the plaintiffs have had their day
in court, and have completely failed factually to prove
a single element of actionable fraud. The jury so found,
and the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD,
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL,
Attorneys for Respondent
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